Abstract: This paper evaluates how the undeclared economy is being tackled in FYR Macedonia. Reporting the findings on the extent and nature of the undeclared economy in this country, FYR Macedonia is shown to have the largest undeclared economy of all European countries and such work is prevalent across all sectors and business types. Examining how the undeclared economy is being tackled, it is revealed that there is a need not only to move away from the current fragmented approach by establishing a single agency or committee to better coordinate the fight against undeclared work in FYR Macedonia but also for a shift away from the current focus upon deterrents and for more attention to be paid to a wider range of measures that enable undeclared work to move into the declared economy. Unless such an approach is pursued then it is likely to remain difficult to make further headway in tackling undeclared work.
Introduction
In recent decades, a burgeoning literature has revealed the persistence and even growth of the undeclared economy in a multifarious array of countries across the world (Dana, 1998 (Dana, , 2010 (Dana, , 2013 Hudson et al., 2012; International Labour Organisation, 2012; Rezaei et al., 2013a Rezaei et al., , 2013b Rezaei et al., , 2014 Schneider et al., 2010; Williams, 2007a Williams, , 2007b Williams, , 2011 Williams, , 2014a Williams, , 2014b Williams, , 2014c Williams, , 2014d Williams and Gurtoo, 2013; Nadin, 2011a, 2011b; . Indeed, this tendency of people and businesses to earn monetary income that they do not declare to the state for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes has been widely recognised to not only lower work quality standards and create risks for the health and safety of workers, but also to act as a brake on economic growth, put at greater risk the financial sustainability of social protection systems and undermine the legitimate business environment through unfair competition (European Commission, 2007; Gallin, 2001; Vanderseypen et al., 2013) . The result is that greater attention has started to be paid to how this undeclared economy can be tackled (Dekker et al., 2010; Dzhekova and Williams, 2014; Franic and Williams, 2014) . To contribute to this literature, the aim of this paper is to provide an evaluation of the policy approach towards the undeclared economy in FYR Macedonia.
Firstly, therefore, this paper provides a baseline assessment of the extent and nature of the undeclared economy in FYR Macedonia. Secondly, the institutional infrastructure for tackling undeclared work in this country is reviewed and thirdly, the policy approach and measures currently adopted for tackling the undeclared economy. Finding that there is a fragmented approach with no one single agency or central committee being responsible for coordinating the fight against undeclared work in FYR Macedonia and that only a narrow range of policy measures are currently adopted for tackling the undeclared economy, the fourth and final section of this paper concludes by calling for a more coordinated approach and a shift away from the current focus upon deterrence and towards an approach and measures that more effectively enable undeclared work to move into the declared economy.
Before commencing, however, the undeclared economy needs to be defined. Although in many developing countries, enterprise-based and jobs-based definitions have been widely used (see Williams, 2013a Williams, , 2014c Williams and Lansky, 2013) , in developed economies it has been activity-based definitions that have been more commonly used to define the scope of the undeclared economy. The most widely used activity-based definition, and the one adopted in this paper, defines the undeclared economy as:
"all legal production activities that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following kinds of reasons: to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes; to avoid payment of social security contributions; to avoid having to meet certain legal standards such as minimum wages, maximum hours, safety or health standards, etc." [OECD, (2002), p.139] This definition has been widely adopted in Europe and other advanced economies (see European Commission, 2007; Vanderseypen et al., 2013; Williams, 2014b Round, 2007, 2009 ). The only absence about this production relative to the declared economy is that the activities are not declared to the authorities for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes. As such, illegal (criminal) activities are excluded, as are unpaid forms of work. In FYR Macedonia, a similar definition is used by the Public Revenue Office who define the undeclared economy as "all economic activities which are legal but unofficial and undeclared for tax purposes, from individuals, unofficial groups and organizations" [Risteski, (2009) 
Extent and nature of the undeclared economy in FYR Macedonia
Various methods exist for measuring the size of the undeclared economy. These range from indirect measurement methods which use proxy indicators and/or seek indications of its size in data collected for other purposes, through to direct survey methods (Garvanlieva et al., 2012; Risteski, 2009; Stankovic and Stankovic, 2012) . The most commonly used indirect survey method is the multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) method of Schneider et al. (2010) . As Figure 1 reveals, this finds that the undeclared economy in FYR Macedonia is the equivalent of 35% of GDP, which means that it is larger than in any other European Union member state. As such, the problem of undeclared work in FYR Macedonia is more acute than in other European countries.
To analyse whether the undeclared economy is growing or declining in FYR Macedonia, Table 1 reports the results of different studies which all use indirect measurement methods. This reveals that whichever measurement method is employed, the finding is that the undeclared economy in FYR Macedonia is gradually decreasing in size over the past decade or so. Similar trends of gradual decline are identified in most other European countries (Williams, 2014c (Williams, , 2014d . Table 1 Changing size of the undeclared economy in FYR Macedonia, 2000 -2011 Two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model (Elgin and Öztunali, 2012) Electricity consumption (Garvanlieva et al., 2012) MIMIC (Garvanlieva et al., 2012) MIMIC (Schneider et al., 2010) Whichever method is used to measure the size of the undeclared economy therefore, the finding is that the undeclared economy is larger in FYR Macedonia than in most, if not all, other European countries. However, it is declining in size in FYR Macedonia over time, akin to other European countries.
Turning to the nature of the undeclared economy, the first issue to consider is whether there are variations in its size across various sectors and business types. As Table 2 displays, which reports the findings of the World Bank Enterprise Survey 2013 so far as FYR Macedonia is concerned, the finding is that manufacturing businesses are more likely that those in retail or services to face competition from unregistered firms. At the same time, formal retail businesses are more likely to perceive such unfair competition as a major constraint to conducting business in the country. Medium-size enterprises (20-99 employees) are also more likely to face competition from those operating in the undeclared economy, followed by small firms. Domestic firms located in South Macedonia are also more affected by the practices of undeclared competitors. Bank, 2014) Examining the types of undeclared work conducted, an OECD study finds that one of the main types of undeclared activity is the under-reporting of economic activity to avoid paying turnover taxes, import duties, personal income and labour taxes (Ahmad, 2007) . Within misreporting practices, under-reported salaries ('envelope wages') are a significant aspect (see Williams, 2009 Williams, , 2013b Padmore, 2013a, 2013b) .
Other common types of misreporting in the non-financial and household sectors include over-reported intermediate consumption, non-registered employment and non-registered sales in trade (UNECE, 2008) . This is similarly the situation elsewhere in Europe (Williams and Martinez, 2014a , 2014c , 2014d . Stankovic and Stankovic (2012) and Tevdoski (2011), meanwhile, note that undeclared work is particularly prevalent in relation to seasonal jobs, temporary or parttime work and affects mostly those with low educational qualification levels, as well as low earners. Examining the level of undeclared jobs within non-standard employment (part-time, fixed-term and own-account jobs/self-employed) based on data from the Labour Force Survey of the State Statistical Office, moreover, Novkovska (2008 Novkovska ( , 2013 finds that in 2007, 77% of undeclared waged work was non-standard and temporary employment, while only 11% of declared waged employment was non-standard and temporary. Indeed, further analysis of the Labour Force Survey reveals that the age groups most likely to engage in undeclared work are young people aged 15-24 (40% of all employed in that age group participate in the undeclared economy), as well as those older than 65 years (over 85% of all employed from that age group). Analysing gender variations, the survey reveals that men are slightly more likely to work in the undeclared economy than women (23.3% of men compared to 21.3% of women for 2012 (State Statistical Office, 2013) .
With respect to own-account work (self-employment), the International Labour Organisation's Labour Force Survey conducted in 2010 shows that 34.7% of non-agricultural self-employment is undeclared, with 48.6% of all sole traders (own-account enterprise owners) operating on an undeclared basis (International Labour Organisation, 2011a). This is a similar level to other countries and displays the existence of a large hidden enterprise culture in FYR Macedonia (Williams, 2007a (Williams, , 2007b (Williams, , 2013a Round, 2007, 2009; Williams and Yousseff, 2014) . The share of undeclared self-employment is much higher in rural areas, where 44.8% of the self-employment is undeclared compared to 28.3% in urban areas. When it comes to dependant wage employment meanwhile, the survey reveals that 9.2% is undeclared wage employment (21.4% of agricultural employees and 8.8% of employees in all other sectors). Undeclared wage employment is higher in rural areas where 14.5% of all wage employees are undeclared, while in urban areas only 6.9% of waged employment is undeclared.
Given this overview of the extent and nature of the undeclared economy in FYR Macedonia, attention now turns to an evaluation of how undeclared work is being tackled by examining firstly, the institutional infrastructure and secondly, the policy approaches and measures being adopted.
Institutional infrastructure for tackling undeclared work
A 2010 study of 31 European countries (Dekker et al., 2010) reveals that eight countries (26%) have either a single agency responsible for the fight against undeclared work or central coordinating committee responsible for ensuring coordinated action by the multifarious departments involved in tackling undeclared work. Furthermore, the study found that there are three main pillars where the authorities' efforts are focused: labour, social security and taxes (Table 3) . FYR Macedonia, similar to other transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, belongs to the group of countries where the main focus in tackling undeclared work is on labour law violation. Although there is no single body responsible for coordinating the fight against undeclared work, the labour inspectorate within the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (MLSP) is the lead agency when it comes to combating undeclared work. At present however, the coordination between the State Labour Inspectorate and other enforcement agencies remains limited, judging by the lack of formal coordination procedures and joined-up strategies, as well as the lack of common targets across different departments . Joint inspections take place mainly in the field of safety at work, and increasingly within tax collection campaigns (between the labour inspectorate and the Public Revenue Office). Some efforts are underway to implement network software enabling the labour inspectorate to access relevant data from other institutions, such as the Central Registry (commercial register), the Public Revenue Office and the Employment Agency, among others. Nevertheless, there is little in the way of shared strategies and targets.
Turning to the role of social partners, there is also room for improvement in terms of their involvement in decision-making with regard to tackling the undeclared economy. While during the 1980s the trade union density (trade union members as percentage of all employees in dependent employment) in FYR Macedonia amounted to 97%-98% (due to fact that all employees were members of a trade union during socialism), this density was only about 28% in 2010 (Eurofound, 2012) . A possible reason for this drop is the general lack of public trust in trade unions, which are not seen as important social actors. They are also seen as close to the political elites and unable to promote and protect the interests of employees. Trade unions have often publicly supported political parties and their election candidates. In 1998 some union leaders were even nominated as left-oriented political party candidates in the parliamentary elections. A similar lack of trust exists when it comes to the main employers' organisation, whose density was also below 24% in 2010 (Eurofound, 2012) . Indeed, there is only one employers' organisation that meets the national representativeness criteria, namely the Employers' Organisation of Macedonia (EOM), which covers about 23% of the private sector employees.
Bipartite and tripartite social dialogue at present occurs mainly through the In the recent past, the ESC has failed to play a significant role due to lack of interest or conflict between its members. For example, no single meeting was held between May 2008 and September 2011. However, there have been some improvements in the last few years, especially following the new agreement of 2010. The ESC members started holding regular meetings. Nevertheless, in 2011 the government changed the Law on Employment and Unemployment Insurance without consulting social partners, although the law is subject to obligatory social dialogue (Anceva, 2012) . There is thus some room for improvement in social dialogue in FYR Macedonia.
Policy approach and measures adopted in FYR Macedonia
Examining the scholarly literature on tackling undeclared work, there are two contrasting policy approaches (see Table 4 ). On the one hand, there is a dominant direct controls approach, which detects and punishes non-compliance and/or provides rewards for those engaging in compliant behaviour. The underlying premise is that people are rational actors who behave in a manner to maximise their expected utility. In other words, they disobey the law if the expected penalty and probability of detection is small relative to the profits gained. Based on this premise, governments must seek to deter these supposedly rational economic actors by making the benefits of non-compliance smaller than the benefits of compliance. To deter engagement therefore, the goal is to change the cost/benefit ratio facing those participating or considering participation in non-compliance (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) . In this deterrence approach, this is achieved by focusing on the cost side of the equation and increasing the actual and perceived risks and costs associated with participation by firstly, raising the perceived or actual likelihood of detection and/or secondly, raising the penalties and sanctions for those caught. North, 1990; Webb et al., 2009 Webb et al., , 2013 Webb et al., , 2014 Williams and Vorley, 2014) . To tackle the undeclared economy therefore, there is a need to reduce this institutional incongruence. This can be achieved in two ways. Firstly, policy can seek to change the norms, values and codes of conduct of the population regarding the acceptability of undeclared work. This can be achieved using awareness raising campaigns about the costs of undeclared work and benefits of declared work, tax education campaigns and normative appeals. Secondly, policy can also seek to change the formal institutions to align with the norms, values and codes of conduct of informal institutions. On the one hand, this involves changing internal processes within the formal institutions to improve the perception that there is tax fairness, redistributive justice and procedural justice. Tax fairness here refers to the extent to which people believe they are paying their fair share compared with others (Wenzel, 2004) . Redistributive justice refers to whether they receive the goods and services they believe that they deserve given the taxes that they pay (Richardson and Sawyer, 2001 ) and procedural justice to the degree to which they believe that the tax authority has treated then in a respectful, impartial and responsible manner (Braithwaite and Reinhart, 2000; Murphy, 2005) . On the other hand, it involves changing the products of formal institutions by pursuing wider economic and social developments that engender a greater commitment of citizens to compliance (Williams, 2014c (Williams, , 2014d .
Policy approaches and measures in FYR Macedonia
Table 5 reviews the implemented approaches and measures to tackle the problem of undeclared work in FYR Macedonia compared with 31 European countries. From this, it is evident that it is the direct controls approach which is dominant in FYR Macedonia and more particularly, a direct controls approach based on the use of deterrents (including penalties and measures related to improving detection). However, even here, there are gaps in policy provision. For example, there is no obligatory registration of workers prior to starting work (a practice in 74% of the other EU countries), which makes it difficult for labour inspectors to deal with the undeclared economy. When turning up to a workplace, an employer can simply claim that the worker has started work that day and has not yet been registered. In addition, a sector-specific approach is absent, except when it comes to targeted inspections in certain high-risk sectors. For example, more inspections could be used to target construction sites, hotels, restaurants, etc., as is the case in Romania, Latvia, Portugal and Sweden (Eurofound, 2013) or introducing an obligatory ID registration for workers in these sectors, as is the case in Belgium (Eurofound, 2013) .
Turning to the incentive measures implemented, these policy measures tend to target the workforce which is about to enter the labour market so as to prevent undeclared work, while paying less attention to the formalisation (curative) of those already operating in the undeclared economy. Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made in some areas, such as reducing compliance costs for doing business and easing the tax burden through a number of supply-side measures, such as tax incentives, a flat-tax system, tax rate simplification, as well as simplified procedures for company registration and paying taxes. In the realm of introducing indirect controls, however, there has been very little progress. Indeed, such an approach and its accompanying measures are near enough entirely absent. Workplace inspections 100
Registration of workers prior to starting work or on first day of work
74
Coordinating strategy across government 57
Certification of business, certifying payments of social contribution and taxes
65
Use of peer-to-peer surveillance (e.g., telephone hotlines) 39
Coordination of operations across government 61
Coordination of data sharing across government 65
Mandatory ID in the workplace 65
Measures enabling compliance:
Incentives: preventative measures 90
Reduce regulations 48
Simplify compliance procedures 87
Technological innovations (e.g., certified cash registers) 43
New categories of work (e.g., for small or mini-jobs) 35
Direct tax incentives (e.g., exemptions, deductions) 61
Social security incentives 35
Ease transition from unemployment into self-employment 65
Ease transition from employment into self-employment 44
Changing minimum wage upwards 48
Changing minimum wage downwards 9
Training and support to business start-ups 61
Micro-finance to business start-ups 52
Advice on how to formalise 61
Connecting pension schemes to formal labour 61
Introducing supply chain responsibility 17
Restricting free movement of (foreign) workers 43
Source: Update of Individual-level amnesties for voluntary disclosure 17
Formalisation advice to business 30
Formalisation support services to businesses 30
Targeted VAT reductions 17
Free record-keeping software to businesses 13
Fact sheets on record-keeping 22
Free advice/training on record-keeping 22
Gradual formalisation schemes 13
Indirect controls 69
Campaigns to inform undeclared workers of risks and costs of working undeclared
61
Campaigns to inform undeclared workers of benefits of formalising their work 57
Campaigns to inform users of undeclared work of the risks and costs
Campaigns to inform users of undeclared work of the benefits of declared work
52
Use of normative appeals to people to declare their activities 52
Measures to change perceived fairness of the system 26
Measures to improve procedural justice of the system (i.e., degree to which people believe government has treated them in a respectful, impartial and responsible manner)
17
Measures to improve knowledge of tax, social security and labour law 65 Adoption of commitment rather than compliance approach (e.g., 'responsive regulation')
30
Campaigns to encourage a culture of commitment to declaration • National campaign for increasing citizens' tax morale and public awareness of the benefits of paying taxes.
Ministry of Education and Science (youth education):
• Educating students in secondary school on the negative effects of undeclared work State Labour Inspectorate (labour inspections and control):
• Strengthening inspection and control on a sectorial basis
• Strengthening cooperation between regional inspectors
• Publishing a 'Black List' of firms with detected irregularities Public Revenue Office (tax revenue collection and control):
• Detecting taxpayers performing undeclared work (with SLI)
• Detecting taxpayers in temporary employment
• Detecting undeclared taxable income of individual taxpayers (MLSP, 2014) There is little evidence, moreover, that this is changing. As Table 6 displays, in the most recent Action Plan for the reduction of the grey economy (Ministry of Economy, 2013; MLSP, 2014) , the focus remains on the use of direct controls for tackling the undeclared economy. Although there is some move towards incentives within the direct controls approach, with for example the MLSP announcing in 2013 that it would implement innovative measures such as measures similar to the Belgian voucher system (ICF and GHK, 2013) , the focus remains on direct controls in general and deterrence measures more particularly. However, there are some signs of recognition that indirect controls which reduce the institutional incongruence between formal and informal institutions can be used to reduce the undeclared economy. The Ministry of Finance and Public Revenue Office has been given responsibility for organising a national campaign for increasing citizens' tax morale and their public awareness of the benefits of paying taxes in a bid to change the values, norms and codes of conduct of informal institutions so as to bring them into line with formal institutions. Nevertheless, the current Action Plan gives little or no explicit attention when tackling the undeclared economy to changing formal institutions in order to promote tax fairness, procedural justice and distributive justice, and there is no explicit recognition that wider economic and social developments may also have a significant impact on the size of the undeclared economy.
Conclusions
This paper has evaluated how the undeclared economy is being tackled in FYR Macedonia. Reporting the findings on the extent and nature of the undeclared economy in this country, it is revealed that FYR Macedonia has the largest undeclared economy of all European countries and such work is prevalent across all sectors of the economy and business types.
Examining how the undeclared economy is being tackled, it is revealed that there is currently no single agency with sole responsibility for tackling the undeclared economy. Instead, responsibility for different facets is fragmented across a range of government institutions, although akin to many other transition economies, the labour inspectorate has tended to take lead responsibility. One way forward therefore, is to establish a single agency or central committee to better coordinate the fight against undeclared work in FYR Macedonia.
To analyse the policy approaches and measures adopted in FYR Macedonia, this paper has differentiated between a dominant direct controls approach, which detects and punishes non-compliance and/or provides rewards for those engaging in compliant behaviour and an emergent indirect controls approach, which depicts undeclared to result from the asymmetry between the laws, codes and regulations of formal institutions and the norms, beliefs and values of informal institutions. To tackle the undeclared economy therefore, this seeks to change not only the informal institutions (e.g., using awareness raising campaigns, tax education and normative appeals) but also formal institutions (e.g., by pursuing tax fairness, procedural justice and redistributive justice, and wider economic and social developments), so as to align the formal and informal institutions.
Analysing the policy approaches and measures adopted in FYR Macedonia, this paper has revealed that policy remains entrenched in the pursuit of a direct controls approach in general, and one based on deterrence measures more particularly. Although there is now a shift towards using incentives to change the cost/benefit ratio, especially through the use of preventative measures, there is little attention being paid to curative measures. More widely, little consideration has so far been given to the policy measures advocated by the indirect controls approach. Although the 2014 Action plan has given responsibility to the Ministry of Finance and Public Revenue Office for organising a national campaign for increasing citizens' tax morale and their public awareness of the benefits of paying taxes in order to seek to change the values, norms and codes of conduct of informal institutions, little or no attention is being paid to changing formal institutions. On the one hand, this involves the implementation of changes to internal processes within formal institutions to improve the perception that there is tax fairness, procedural justice and redistributive justice. On the other hand, it involves changing the products of formal institutions by pursuing wider economic and social developments that engender a greater commitment of citizens to compliance. Previous studies reveal that this would require the creation of a more equal (as measured by the gini-coefficient) society in which there is greater labour market intervention to protect vulnerable groups, higher levels of social protection and more effective redistribution via social transfers (Williams, 2014a) .
If this paper therefore encourages greater reflection in both FYR Macedonia and beyond on the range of policy approaches and measures being used when tackling undeclared work, and more particularly on the role that indirect controls measures might play, then it will have achieved its main policy-oriented intention. If it also leads to the wider recognition that it is the asymmetry between the codified laws and regulations of formal institutions and the values, norms and codes of conduct of informal institutions that determines the persistence of an undeclared economy, then it will have achieved its wider scholarly intention.
